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Unlike most American sports, European football clubs have the luxury of acquiring or 
selling players for a “transfer fee”.  Because some European clubs are publicly held, these 
transfers often have an immediate impact on share price. This study will examine the effect of 
transfers of different magnitudes on the share prices of several publicly held European 
football clubs.  A key portion of this thesis revolves around an adaptation of H.H.T. Peter’s 
and Douros Athanasios’s 2013 studies “Share Price Reaction to Football Transfers” and “The 
Market Reaction to Football Player Transfers in Europe” to analyze the effect of “High”, 
“Medium”, or “Low” transfer fees defined as a percentage of the team’s total market transfer 
value at the time of the announcement.  This addition will make assumptions regarding the 
impact of expensive or inexpensive transfers on share price that can be applied to a club of 
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1.  Introduction 
Many sports fans want nothing more than to see their teams win, which sadly, is often 
a sentiment that their favorite team’s owners may not share.  Throughout the United States 
and global sports leagues the for-profit nature of sports has elevated the level of on-field play, 
but has also created debates regarding the true motivations of franchise owners.  In the United 
States all sports franchises are privately owned (with the exception of the Green Bay 
Packers), which makes the answer to these debates difficult to attain and open to speculation.  
In European Football there are around thirty teams that are publicly traded on various Stock 
Exchanges.  This creates a potential conflict of interest unique in the world of sports.  Now 
team executives must walk a fine line between the objective of a public company to 
maximize shareholder profits, and doing what will aid the team’s on-field performance.  It is 
reasonable to assume that on-field success leads to greater profits; however this is not always 
the case.   
1.1 The Nature of Transfers 
European football employs a player acquisition system that is completely different 
than most American sports franchise systems.  In the four major United States sports leagues, 
players under contract with another team must be traded in a two way exchange of players.  
In Europe, players are bought or sold for a cash “transfer fee”.  This gives team executives 
direct monetary incentives to sell their quality players for a quick cash payout.  If a team 
decides to sell all of its best players, fans may assume that the owner is acting to maximize 
the bottom line at the detriment of wins.  When a team spends exorbitantly to acquire world 
class talent, the opposite may be assumed.  For publicly held franchises, these assumptions 
pit the club’s shareholders squarely against its third party fans. 




 This thesis will examine the effect of transfers on the share prices of publicly held 
European football clubs.  The end result will be to determine whether transferring a player 
has a direct result on share price movement.  At the conclusion of the study fans should have 
a clear answer to the question of executive motivation when acquiring or losing players.  If 
the share price rises after announcing the sale of a player, because the club received only cash 
we may conclude that the executives are maximizing short-term profits.  On the contrary, if a 
club announces the purchase of a player and share price drops, one might view this as 
executives putting winning over shareholder profit.   
Significance 
 Why do we care about the relationship between transfers and share prices?  Quite 
frankly football is a big business.  Some of the top clubs have estimated values exceeding 
billions of dollars (Forbes, 2013) and transfer fees have been known to exceed 100 million 
dollars (Forbes, 2013). When this much money is changing hands it is important to analyze 
the motivations of the parties in charge.  The reality is that football players are intangible 
assets for a public firm, and are typically the most expensive assets on a club’s balance sheet 
(Amir and Livne, 2005). If a more traditional public company decides to spend $100 million 
in one day to acquire an asset, wouldn’t you want to know exactly what effect that major 
move would have on your shares?  To many the idea of investing in a sports team seems very 
strange, and while it is becoming more common and acceptable, potential investors still want 
to gain a better understanding of the nature of the business model and factors that affect the 
movement of share prices.  Because transfers have a huge effect on a club’s on-field 
performance, it is important to also analyze their effect on share price and firm value.   
 The relationship between transfers and share prices also impacts a club’s youth 
development program.  Top teams like Real Madrid and Barcelona spend millions of euros 




every year on their developmental programs, which find young talent around the world and 
begin training them to become the future of the club.  Often these players are found and 
signed before leaving elementary school.  If a club successfully develops a quality player it 
then has two options: (1) keep the player to improve the current squad, or (2) sell him to the 
highest bidder.  Obviously it is cheaper to pay a small fee to sign a player when he is 
unknown as opposed to buying him once he is a star.  This study should help to shed light on 
the importance of development programs.  If the positive effect on share price from selling a 
player (or negative effect from buying a player) is strong, this could increase the importance 
of internally generating a club’s own stars at a comparatively low cost.    
 Finally, European football is the most popular sport worldwide (Matheson, 2003) and 
plays a significant role in the lives of millions of people.  According to Forbes, the English 
club Manchester United has over 600 million followers worldwide.  Because teams like 
Manchester United are also publicly traded, this study has implications on their brand 
maintenance. If executives have a better understanding of the effect of transfers on share 
price, they are better suited to balance their club’s short-term profits vs. long-term brand 
management. 
 This thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 will discuss prior research and 
hypotheses. Section 3 will explain the methodology behind gathering and analyzing data, as 









2. Previous Research  
2.1 FIFA and the Bosman Ruling 
The Fédération Internationale de Football Association or, FIFA, is the governing body that 
rules of all European Football Leagues from its headquarters in Zurich, Switzerland.  
Historically FIFA has been viewed as an extremely powerful governing body which has often 
won small battles in favor of team ownership over players, who are represented by a 
relatively weak players union. Players have consistently found themselves rather helpless 
largely due to the fact that many play in foreign markets and the frequency with which the 
players change leagues.  One instance of player power was the Bosman Ruling in 1995, in 
which players won a monumental victory over team owners.  Prior to the 1995-1996 season 
Jean-Marc Bosman wished to transfer from RFC Liege in the Belgian league to Dunkerque in 
the French league.  Despite the fact that his contract had expired, Dunkerque refused to pay 
the transfer fee that RFC Liege was demanding so RFC Liege refused to transfer him. 
Bosman brought the case to the European Court of Justice to appeal for his right to transfer 
teams.   
 The Court ruled in favor of Bosman by declaring that FIFA was in violation of article 
48 of the Treaty of Rome which is related to the freedom of movement and labour. Simmons 
(1997) mentions two basic restrictions that were changed by the Bosman Ruling.  First, no 
longer is a transfer fee mandatory when a player changes teams, and it is now illegal once a 
player is out of contract.  Second, the previous restrictions of how many foreign born players 
could compete in a single match was removed.  This ruling shocked the football world and 
changed the basic theory about transferring players.  Now when a player is under a contract 
that is soon to expire, the club is highly incentivized to transfer him for a fee rather than face 
the possibility of him walking away for no compensation once his contract expires. Also, 




getting rid of the restrictions on foreign players took always all reservations concerning 
signing foreign players, thereby created far more markets for teams to transfer a player.  The 
Bosman ruling proved to be critical in shaping the modern transfer market. 
 
2.2 Transfer Impact on Share Price 
 Studies have been conducted to examine the effects of transfers on share prices.  In 
2013, Douros Athanasios of the Universiteit van Tilburg wrote a paper entitled “The Market 
Reaction to Football Player Transfers in Europe.”  In his paper Athanasios used the same 
methodology described in this proposal to answer two questions: (1) will the share price of a 
European football club increase abnormally following the sale of a player? And (2) will the 
share price of a European football club decrease abnormally following the acquisition of a 
player?  At the conclusion of his paper, Athanasios accepted both his hypotheses.  Later in 
2013, H.T.T. Peters wrote a paper entitled “Share Price Reactions to European Transfers”, 
which expanded upon Athanasios’s research.  Peters added several hypotheses to examine the 
effect of things like transfers between rival teams and non-rival teams, attacking players 
versus defensive players, left footed players vs. right footed players, and the amount spent on 
the transfer.  Both previous studies used a data set that was limited to transfers greater than or 
equal to €8 million, which only applies to a select few teams. The majority of football clubs 
cannot afford to spend that much money on a single player, which means the findings hold no 
significance for them.  In this thesis I have used the methods of Anathanasios, but expanded 
the data pool to include transfers of any monetary value. Theoretically, my findings should 
apply to a publicly traded football club of any magnitude or spending power. 
2.3 Hypothesis 




 In this paper we expect shareholders of publicly held European football clubs to react 
significantly to the changes of football players.  We expect an increase in shareholder wealth 
resulting from the sale of players and a decrease in shareholder wealth resulting from the 
purchase of players. More specifically we introduce two hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1 
The acquisition of a football player will result in negative abnormal football club 
stock returns around the announcement date. 
Hypothesis 2 
The sale of a football player will trigger positive abnormal football club stock returns 
around the announcement date. 
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1 Sample Selection and Data Sources 
 Our empirical analysis employed data from all clubs listed on the STOXX European 
Football Index, which covers all publicly traded teams traded on European, Eastern European 
and Turkish stock exchanges.  The Index covers 23 teams, 17 of which purchased or sold 
players for any monetary value for the 2012/2013 season.  An overview of the purchases and 
sales for every team is detailed in table 1. 
(Insert Table 1) 
 From these 17 teams, transfer histories were taken from transfermarket.eu. This 
website is the reference for all transfers. Transfer announcements were taken from online 
sources ranging from ESPN.com and skysports.com to news outlets in the local market of the 
club.   




 Historical firm share prices, and indices levels were taken from a variety of sources, 
including Google Finance and Yahoo Finance.  One index was used for each country having 
a football club in the data set, and were selected based on the most actively traded indices in 
each country according to Bloomberg.com. 
3.2 Data Set 
 In total 17 of the 23 clubs on the STOXX European Football Index engaged in a 
transfer for any monetary value during the 2012/2013 season.  From these 17 clubs there 
were 144 player transfers, of which 69 were inbound or “purchases” and 75 were outbound or 
“sales”.  The most difficult aspect of the data collection was the establishment of an accurate 
date of the transfer announcement.  Out of the 144 transfers, only 82 had confirmed transfer 
announcement dates. This stemmed from a number of reasons;   
1. Some of the transfers were for extremely small fees, which often do not make the 
news. 
2. Some of the 23 STOXX teams are small and local, which lowers their spending 
power as well as their media coverage. 
3. Some potential articles were found, yet were in foreign languages which I could 
not translate. Only articles written in English or Spanish were analyzed. 
Finally one English club, Rangers Football Club, had its initial public offering in December 
of 2012.  This meant that finding historical share prices was impossible for the dates 
corresponding with the announcement of 9 of the club’s 11 transfers during that season. For 
the other 2 FC Rangers transfers, the lack of historical price data made running a linear 
regression for our estimation period impossible.  Because of these difficulties, the 11 FC 
Rangers transfers were removed from the data set.   





3.3 Methodology   
 This thesis was conducted as an event study.  De Jong and Doeij (2011) created a 
three step system for conducting an event study. 
i. Spot the event of interest and more specifically the timing of the event 
ii. Specify a benchmark model to measure the normal stock return behavior 
iii. Calculate and analyze abnormal returns around the event date 
The spot and timing of the event will be defined as the official press release by the 
club that is acquiring the player. An estimation period was required for finding normal stock 
return behavior and was defined as the period spanning 51 to 21 days prior to the event 
occurring.  The event window was defined as 20, 10, 5, 3 and 1 day before AND after the 
official club announcement.   
 Actual historic returns were taken for the estimation period for both the index and 
club that either purchased or sold the player.  Once the data was collected for these 30 days 
regression analysis was used to estimate the market model (clubreturn = intercept + 
slopecoefficient x marketreturn) to predict expected club returns during the event window. 
An example of a regression analysis for the club, AFC Ajax, is shown in exhibit 2. 
(Insert Exhibit 2) 
 Predicted normal returns were then subtracted from actual club returns on each day of 
the event window, and reported for the dates (-20,+20) (-10,+10) (-5,+5) (-3,+3) (-1,+1) from 
the transfer announcement, to find abnormal returns on that day.  The abnormal returns were 
then summed for each transaction to find cumulative abnormal return or CAR. We define 
cumulative abnormal return as: 




CARi = ARit1 + … + ARit2 = ∑t=t1tt=2ARit. 
The CARs are summed by category (inbound vs. outbound, team, size) to find a cumulative 
average abnormal return or CAAR. Cumulative average abnormal return is: 
CAAR = (1/N)∑Ni=1(CARi) 
 Most studies of this nature would then conduct a T test to control for event clustering, 
however, for reasons explained in section 4, a T test was not conducted. 
 The final step was to establish the parameters for classifying a transfer as small, 
medium, or large.  This was done by comparing each transfer fee to the market value of the 
club’s entire roster, which was taken from transfermarket.eu.  The classifications were as 
follows: 
- A transfer with a fee equal to less than 1.5% of the club’s market transfer value 
was deemed “small”. 
- A transfer with a fee representing between 1.5-4.0% of the club’s market transfer 
value was deemed “medium”. 
- A transfer with a fee greater than 4% of the club’s market transfer value was 
deemed “large”. 
A summary of the magnitude levels of the transfers is provided by exhibit 3. 
(Insert Exhibit 3) 
4. Results 
 The cumulative average abnormal returns were 2.459% and -1.656% for inbound and 
outbound transfers respectively. When breaking the returns down by the size categories, we 
found that player purchases resulted in cumulative average abnormal returns of 6.455%, 




1.218%, and -3.076% for small, medium, and large transfers respectively.  Outbound 
transfers resulted in cumulative abnormal returns of -0.907%, 1.456%, and -4.644% for 
small, medium, and large transfers respectively.  These findings intuitively do not make 
sense. Theoretically, a transfer of the greatest magnitude would have the strongest effect on 
share price, irrespective of the direction of the price movement, however, when analyzing 
purchases we found that the CAARs of small transfers were more extreme than transfers of 
medium and high transfers.   A summary of the CAAR results is provided in exhibit 4. 
(Insert Exhibit 4) 
 We also analyze the cumulative average returns at each day during the event window.  
Theoretically, there should be relatively stable abnormal returns and a jump in return at the 
event window. For inbound transfers we found cumulative abnormal returns of 0.471%, 
0.251%, 0.094%, 0.334%, 0.327%, 0.065%, -0.690%, -0.198%, 0.506%, and 2.459% for -20, 
-10, -5, -3, -1, +1, +3, +5, +10, and +20 days from the announcement of the transfer.  Again 
this does not make much intuitive sense because our lowest cumulative abnormal return 
occurred one day after the announcement.  For outbound transfers we found returns of 0.35%, 
-0.408%, -0.373%, 0.372%, -0.743%, -1.309%, 0.406%, 0.036%, 0.125%, and -0.067% for -
20, -10, -5, -3, -1, +1, +3, +5, +10, and +20 days respectively.  These findings make more 
intuitive sense than the findings for inbound transfers primarily because the most extreme 
jump in cumulative abnormal return came immediately after the announcement of the 
transfer.  The findings for average CAR at each day of the event window are summarized in 
exhibit 5, and the individual CARs are illustrated graphically for inbound players in exhibit 6 
and outbound players in exhibit 7. 
(Insert Exhibit 5, 6, and 7) 




The most likely rationale for the inconsistent and counterintuitive nature of our 
findings is that our predicted normal returns were not reliable.  There is significant evidence 
to support this claim because the average R2 for our 17 team regressions was 0.052747, which 
means that just over 5% of the variability of the teams’ historical returns was explained by 
the historical returns on the various indices.  This is not significant enough to make the 
market model reliable.  As the market model is needed to forecast expected prices, the low 
explanatory power puts the results in question.  The data for our most reliable findings proves 
to be slightly more consistent. To forecast normal returns for the club AFC Ajax we used the 
AEX index which is composed of the 25 most actively traded Dutch companies listed on the 
NYSE Euronext Amsterdam, formerly known as the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. After 
running the regression, the R2 value was 14.02% which is about 9% higher than the average 
R2 value.  For AFC Ajax purchases, cumulative average abnormal returns were 3.940%, and -
1.630% for medium and large transfers respectively. The total CAAR for inbound transfers 
was 1.137%.  For outbound transfers we found cumulative average abnormal returns of -
1.720%, -3.785%, and -3.064% for small, medium, and large transfers respectively. The total 
CAAR for outbound transfers was -2.886%. These findings are more logical because for all 
transfer magnitudes, the outbound CAARs are negative, which if found more consistently and 
for multiple teams, could imply that abnormal negative returns follow the sale of a player.  
While this did not hold true for the purchases, the sample size was considerably smaller, 
which affected the weighting of the averages.  A summary of the CAARs for AFC Ajax is 
presented in exhibit 8. 
(Insert Exhibit 8) 
 
 





The main issue is that we were unable to prove a correlation between the returns of 
the chosen indices and the club returns.  It is standard practice to use the most commonly 
traded index from each country to gain an understanding of the market movements as a 
whole.  For instance, when analyzing the movement of the US economy and predicting prices 
going forward, the S&P 500 would be a logical choice, however, for this study that theory did 
not hold true.  Given more time and resources it would have been prudent to analyze more 
indices or alternative methods to use as a benchmark for the regression analysis.  This leaves 
room for further research into the most effective way to select indices when attempting to 
correlate firm performance with index performance. Further research could also focus on 
alternative methods for predicting future return that do not rely on equations formulated by 
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Transfers for the period Jan, 1, 2012 through Jan 31, 2013 from the STOXX European 
Football Index 
 
 Exhibit 2 








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.000384 0.000384 2.936042 0.103792261
Residual 18 0.002357 0.000131
Total 19 0.002741
CoefficientsStandard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.001252557 0.002565 0.488262 0.631259 -0.004137021 0.006642 -0.004137021 0.006642135
X Variable 1 0.272023975 0.158754 1.713488 0.103792 -0.061506843 0.605555 -0.061506843 0.605554794










A breakdown of player transfer sizes into categories of “small”, “medium”, and “large” as a 











Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) reported at (-20, +20) (-10, +10) (-5, +5) (-3, +3) (-1, 
+1) days from the transfer announcement. 
-20 Days -10 Days -5 Days -3 Days -1 Days +1 Days +3 Days +5 Days +10 Days +20 Days
Sales 0.35% -0.408% -0.373% 0.372% -0.743% -1.309% 0.406% 0.036% 0.125% -0.067%
Purchases 0.471% 0.251% 0.094% 0.334% 0.327% 0.065% -0.690% -0.198% 0.506% 2.459%








Less than 1% Small 23
1%-4% Medium 27
Greater than 4% Large 21
Total 71
Magnitude of Transfers






































CAARs of the Dutch club, AFC Ajax, broken down by purchases vs. sales and magnitude.  
 
Purchase Sale
Small - -1.720%
Medium 3.940% -3.785%
Large -1.630% -3.064%
Total 1.137% -2.886%
AFC AJAX CAAR
